NSC BRIEFING

8 September 1954

## SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA

## **NSA** review completed

- I. The next two to three months, because of the pending troop withdrawal program, may be the most critical to date in US-South Korean relations.
  - A. Rhee is resentful and emotionally disturbed over the failure of his Washington visit.
  - B. He had hoped to persuade the US to renew the war, or alternatively, to provide him with greatly increased military forces.
  - C. He wanted to redirect American policy away from a strong Japan as the foundation of the American position in the Western Pacific.
  - D. He is angry over the withdrawal, which he characterizes as "abandonment."

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- III. Since his return, Rhee has adopted more contentious and independent policies.
  - A. He has publicly attacked several American officials, the US troop deployment program, the military and economic aid program, and SEAP.
  - B. Secretary Dulles has been criticized as subservient to the British and French, officially inspired rumors allege that he is pro-Japanese, and on 1 September the official Korean press has accused the Secretary of working to embrace Mao Tse-tung.

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- D. Rhee and his ministers have publicly disparaged
  American efforts to form a SEAP which excludes
  South Korea and includes Britain and France.
- IV. Official statements and press comments on South Korean-Japanese differences have recently become so provocative as to preclude successful negotiations of outstanding differences.
  - A. During the last few days, armed Korean occupation of the Liancourt Rocks, which is also claimed by the Japanese, was announced in a deliberately provocative manner. In order recover lost prestige at home, it is possible Rhee will seek to provoke a clash at sea with Japan, in which they have an advantage because of relative air superiority.

    ROK maritime police not under UNC.
- V. On 1 September, South Korea informed the US that Korea has decided to ask the neutral nations supervisory commission (NNSC) to leave within one week of notification.

  No date set for notification.

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- A. Prior to his departure for the US, Rhee instructed his provost marshal general to take measures to eject the NNSC. Incipient violence curbed as a result of American urging at the time of Rhee's visit.
- B. If the South Korean government now chooses to act through unofficial patriotic groups, it will be virtually impossible to insure absolute security to the commission members.
- VI. It remains possible that these threatening developments are primarily designed for psychological pressure on the United States government, to gain his objectives.
  - A. The developments are particularly disturbing, however, because his present resentful, agitated mood could result in dangerous and irrational conduct.

Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000400050002-6